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THE CHARGE IS LIBEL: THE BEST DEFENSE IS AN
AGGRESSIVE OFFENSE WHEN A PUBLIC OFFICIAL
SUES THE MEDIA
I. INTRODUCTION
When delivering his first inaugural address, President Thomas
Jefferson paid tribute to the principles on which the nascent govern-
ment was founded. Among those principles, Jefferson praised "the
diffusion of information" prompted by freedom of the press, and
counseled that:1
The wisdom of our sages and blood of our heroes has been de-
voted to their attainment; they should be the creed of our politi-
cal faith; the text of civic instruction; the touchstone by which to
try the services of those we trust; and should we wander from
them in moments of error or alarm, let us hasten to retrace our
steps and to regain the road which alone leads to peace, liberty,
and safety.2
Despite Jefferson's admonitions, the dual intent of the first
amendment's freedom of the press clause,3 to provide the public with
a marketplace for ideas and to serve as an independent check on
governmental activities," has been eroded by unwarranted libel suits
brought by public officials against the print and broadcast media.'
In 1964, the United States Supreme Court warned that, if
abused, libel suits could cast a "pall of fear and timidity" over the
media's right to freely criticize the conduct of public officials.6
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1. Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address, (Mar. 4, 1801), reprinted in S. BRAD-
LEY, R. BEATTY, E. LONG, & G. PERKINS, THE AMERICAN TRADITION IN LITERATURE 343
(5th ed. 1981).
2. Id.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides that "Congress shall make no laws respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for redress of grievances."
4. Stewart, "Or of the Press", 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 634 (1975).
5. E.g., Laxalt v. McClatchy Newspapers, 622 F. Supp. 737 (D. Nev. 1985) for $250
million; Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) for $500 million; Westmore-
land v. CBS, Inc., 596 F. Supp. 1166 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) for $120 million.
6. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 278 (1964).
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Twenty years later, the high Court's apprehension concerning "me-
dia chill" was realized when two widely publicized actions were filed
in federal court: General William Westmoreland filed a $120 million
libel suit against CBS, Inc.,' and former Israeli Defense Minister
General Ariel Sharon sought $500 million in a libel suit against
Time, Inc." Although neither case was decided in favor of the plain-
tiff, the repercussions were felt immediately throughout the news in-
dustry: some publishers and producers demanded that reporters ad-
here to more exacting journalistic standards; others discontinued
investigative reporting on controversial subjects.9
Various privileges protect the media's constitutional right to
question and comment on the conduct and actions of public officials.
These privileges are based on the first amendment and on the notion
that public officials have ample access to resources with which to
counter the media's allegations and thus avert damage to their repu-
tation. However, since the mid-1970's an increasing number of
"public official plaintiff-media defendant" libel cases have been al-
lowed to proceed to trial. For example, Senator Paul Laxalt filed a
$250 million suit against the McClatchy Newspapers for libel, con-
spiracy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.1 The
McClatchy Newspapers published three articles in 1983 which al-
leged improprieties in the operation of a Nevada casino owned by
Senator Laxalt, and linked Laxalt to organized crime."
The "chill" resulting from libel suits initiated by public officials
such as General Westmoreland, General Sharon, and Senator Laxalt
is heightened by media centralization. In fact, the omnipresence of
the media is a strong narcotic, inducing the illusion that a variety of
distinct perspectives accompanies the abundance of media. The sig-
nificant reduction in print media that has occurred in recent years,
balanced by the increase in electronic media, lends credence to this
perception.2
However, the apparent offset is deceptive. The nine largest
newspaper publishers own over thirty percent of the country's news-
papers and control approximately twenty-five percent of the televi-
7. Westmoreland, 596 F. Supp. 1170 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
8. Sharon, 599 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
9. Massing, The Libel Chill: How Cold is it Out There?, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV.
31, 33 (May-June 1985).
10. Laxalt v. McClatchy Newspapers, 622 F. Supp. 737 (D. Nev. 1985).
11. Id. at 739.
12. Statistical Abstracts of the United States, (107th ed. 1987), U.S. DEP'T. OF COM-
MERCE & BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 8-537 (Dec. 1986) (hereinafter Abstracts).
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sion stations.' s Although the Federal Communication Commission(FCC) regulates the number of radio and television stations that any
one group can hold, 4 the nine largest newspaper publishers none-
theless could control approximately forty percent of the present radio
and television stations. Consequently, when a substantial portion of
the media is controlled by a small group of individuals, the market-
place for ideas, which appears to be offered by the numerous broad-
cast stations, newspapers, and other publications in fact is reduced to
a "neutral conduit of information."1 Media centralization thus ex-
acerbates the libel chill issue by further restricting both subject mat-
ter and perspectives on that material.
Therefore, it is imperative that attorneys who represent media
13. Broadcasting/Cablecasting Yearbook 1987, A53-58 (hereinafter B/C); STANDARD
AND POOR'S REGISTER OF CORPORATIONS, DIRECTORS AND EXECUTIVES 1987, Vol. I (here-
inafter S&P). The country's nine largest newspaper publishers are Capital Cities/ABC,
Donrey Media Group, Gannett Company, Inc., Harte-Hanks Communications, Hearst Cor-
poration, Knight-Ridder, the New York Times Company, Parks Communications, and E.W.
Scripps Company. B/C, supra, at A34-58. Capital Cities/ABC owns 20 daily and weekly
newspapers, 87 other publications, 19 radio stations, and eight television stations. B/C, supra,
at A53. Headquartered in New York, Capital Cities/ABC employs 19,700 people and had
revenues of $1.02 billion in 1986. S&P, supra, at 450. The Donrey Media Group owns 120
newspapers, four radio stations, and one television station. B/C, supra, at A53-54. Headquar-
tered in Ft. Smith, Arkansas, the Donrey Media Group has 4,000 employees and 1986 reve-
nues of $200 million. S&P, supra, at 751. The Gannett Co., located in Washington, D.C.,
owns 88 newspapers, 18 radio stations, and seven television stations. B/C, supra, at A54.
Gannett employs 26,000 people and had revenues of $2.21 billion in 1986. S&P, supra, at
1013. Harte-Hanks Communications of San Antonio, Texas, owns 53 newspapers and three
television stations. B/C, supra, at A55. Harte-Hanks had 1986 revenues of $550 million and
employs 10,000 people. S&P, supra, at 1144. The Hearst Corporation of New York owns 17
newspapers, 15 magazines, 19 other publications, two publishing companies, seven radio sta-
tions, and six television stations. B/C, supra, at A55. Knight-Ridder of Miami, Florida, owns
34 newspapers and nine television stations. B/C, supra, at A55-56. Knight-Ridder employs
22,000 people and had 1986 revenues of $1.73 billion. S&P, supra, at 1392. The New York
Times Company, located in New York, owns .34 newspapers, a one-third interest in the Inter-
national Herald Tribune (Paris, France), five magazines, two radio stations, and five television
stations. B/C, supra, at A56-57. The New York Times Co. employs 10,350 people and had
revenues of $1.39 billion in 1986. S&P, supra, at A52. Park Communications is based in
Ithaca, New York, and owns 75 newspapers, 19 radio stations, and seven television stations.
B/C, supra, at A57. Park Communications has 1800 employees and $113.07 million in 1986
revenues. S&P, supra, at 1861. E.W. Scripps owns Scripps-Howard of Cincinnati, Ohio,
which in turn owns 53 newspapers, 23 other publications, five radio stations, and nine televi-
sion stations. B/C, supra, at A57-58. Scripps-Howard employs 950 people and had 1986
revenues of $134.54 million. S&P, supra, at 2138. E.W. Scripps Co. also owns United Press
International (revenues over $75 million), the Newspaper Enterprise Association (revenues
between $30-35 million and 200 employees), the Pittsburg Press (2000 employees), and the
Denver Publishing Company ($250-260 million in 1986 revenues and 3000 employees). S&P,
supra, at 2138.
14. B/C, supra note 13, at A34.
15. Stewart, supra note 4, at 634.
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defendants have an immediate and appropriate tool with which to
deter public officials from filing frivolous or intentionally intimidat-
ing libel suits. This comment will examine the chilling effect that
libel suits have on the "Fourth Estate," ' and will propose the use of
a tort combining abuse of process 7 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983,8 with
which to counter unjustified libel litigation initiated by public
officials.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Chilling of the Media
1. Brief History of Libel Law
In 1964, the Supreme Court declared that the first amendment
freedom of expression clause entitled defendants involved in defama-
tion actions to a wide zone of protection, and so devised a rigorous
burden of proof for potential plaintiffs in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan. 9 That ruling required public officials to prove actual mal-
ice on the part of the media with convincing clarity before recovering
damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to their official con-
duct.20 The Court defined actual malice as either knowledge of the
falsity of a statement, or reckless disregard of that statement's truth
or falsity.2 ' Of equal import, the New York Times decision altered
the common law of strict liability in defamation actions by affirming
the supremacy of the United States Constitution, particularly the
first amendment.22
16. Stewart, supra note 4, at 634. Thomas Carlyle, the early nineteenth century Eng-
lish essayist and historian, coined the term "Fourth Estate" to describe the role of the Report-
ers' Gallery in relation to the Three Estates of Parliament. Justice Stewart compared the role
of the American press to its British counterpart, and observed that the press acts as a fourth
branch of government, ensuring the integrity of the three official branches. Stewart, supra note
4, at 634.
17. Abuse of process is an "improper use or perversion of process after it has been
issued." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 11 (5th ed. 1979). See also infra notes 142-53 and ac-
companying text.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) states in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the juris-
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
19. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
20. Id. at 286.
21. Id. at 279-80.
22. Id. at 284.
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The Court followed the New York Times standard in Rosenblatt
v. Baer"8 and designed a two-pronged test for determining whether a
party was a public official. The first prong focused on whether the
position in government was of particular interest to the public;"4 the
second prong addressed whether the public had an "independent in-
terest" in the qualifications and performance of the aggrieved indi-
vidual beyond the general public's interest in government employees
and their performance. 5
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts" extended the New York Times
constitutional limitations to suits brought by public figures involved
in issues of important public interest. 7 In addition, the Curtis Court
held that the "actual malice" requirement was satisfied by a showing
of "highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure
from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered
to by responsible publishers."28 Four years later, the Court in Ro-
senbloom v. Metromedia" expanded the New York Times standard
to cases involving an event of public or general interest."0
The zeal with which the Court upheld freedom of the press
began to wane in 1974. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 1 the Court
restricted its prior rulings by holding that the actual malice standard
applied only to public officials and figures, but not to matters regard-
ing solely public or general interest. 2 The Gertz Court also ruled
that although the states were required to apply the actual malice
standard in suits brought by public officials, that standard was not
required in suits initiated by private parties so long as strict liability
was not imposed.8" Instead, private parties merely were required to
show negligent publication and actual damages, including damage to
reputation. 4
In 1979, the Court injected confusion into then existing libel
law in Herbert v. Lando,35 when it allowed inquiry into the defend-
23. 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
24. Id. at 85.
25. Id. at 86.
26. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
27. Id. at 132.
28. Id. at 158.
29. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
30. Id. at 51-52.
31. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
32. Id. at 351.
33. Id. at 347.
34. Id. at 349-50.
35. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
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ant's state of mind to prove actual malice." Thus, notes, conversa-
tions, and memoranda which reflected the defendant's state of mind
prior to publication could be used to establish actual malice regard-
less of the content of the final publication. As such, the defendant's
thoughts, not the alleged defamatory publication, became the focal
point for determining actual malice. Not surprisingly, the Herbert
decision has been attacked for obscuring the actual malice issue, un-
duly prolonging the discovery phase, and ensuring an increased fi-
nancial burden, particularly for defendants.37
2. Recent Libel Litigation
The increase in libel litigation initiated by public officials, and
the willingness of many judges to allow those suits to proceed to
trial, has led to several phenomena. Some journalists take greater
care to ensure the accuracy of their stories, thus hoping to produce
libel-proof materials."8 Alternately, others are wary of reporting on
controversial issues or litigious individuals.3 9 Two recent cases, West-
moreland v. CBS, Inc.40 and Sharon v. Time, Inc.,4 provide a use-
ful perspective regarding libel litigation's chilling effect on the
media.
a. Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc.
General William Westmoreland's $120 million libel action
against CBS was brought in response to a 1983 60 Minutes televi-
sion documentary. The documentary probed the veracity of intelli-
gence reports estimating enemy strength provided to top military
personnel and the press during General Westmoreland's command
in Vietnam.4 General Westmoreland asserted that the documentary
was biased and inadequate,43 and that CBS exhibited "dishonesty
36. Id. at 160-65, 171-75.
37. Massing, supra note 9, at 34.
38. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 160-65, 171-75.
39. Massing, supra note 9, at 35.
40. 596 F. Supp. 1170 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
41. 599 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
42. Westmoreland, 596 F. Supp. at 1171. General Westmoreland served as Commander
of the United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) from 1964 through
1968. Id. at 1171. The documentary, entitled The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception,
aired January 23, 1983, after CBS had researched the subject for approximately one year and
conducted interviews with more than 80 people, many of whom had participated in the dis-




and willful falsity in the editing and presentation of evidence"4 suf-
ficient to support a finding of constitutional malice. CBS claimed im-
munity under the first amendment from a public official "challeng-
ing commentary on his performance of the duties of his office," 45 and
urged the court to make the immunity absolute, even though no such
precedent existed.'
No conclusive holding developed from the case; General West-
moreland settled the action before it was submitted to the jury. 7
Nonetheless, the court reaffirmed the notion that "a publisher who
honestly believes in the truth of his accusations (and can point to a
non-reckless basis for his beliefs) is under no obligation under the
libel law to treat the subject of his accusations fairly or even-
handedly."4
In spite of CBS' apparent victory, the extensive discovery pro-
ceedings, the damages requested by General Westmoreland, and the
propensity of juries to "give away the farm"' 9 created a wave of
concern within the news industry. The Westmoreland case reiterated
the unwelcome fact that controversial articles concerning public offi-
cials, no matter how thoroughly researched, were always subject to
libel litigation.
b. Sharon v. Time, Inc.
General Ariel Sharon, Israeli Defense Minister from August
1981 through mid-February 1983, brought a $500 million libel ac-
tion against Time magazine over an article regarding Israel's 1982
campaign to rid Lebanon of the Palestine Liberation Organization.5
At the time of the article's publication, Israel occupied West Beirut
and supervised several Palestinian refugee camps.5" Between Sep-
tember 16-18, 1982, members of the Christian Phalangist militia en-
tered two of the camps by prior arrangement with the Israeli De-
fense forces; hundreds of Palestinian refugees were massacred.52
44. Id. at 1174.
45. Id. at 1171.
46. Id.
47. Rothmyer, Westmoreland v. CBS: Reflections on a Major Media Event-and the
Issues it Did Not Resolve, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. 25, 26 (May-June 1985).
48. Id. at 30.
49. Massing, supra note 9, at 33.
50. Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). The subject article,
entitled The Verdict Is Guilty, appeared in the February 21, 1983 edition of TIME and ques-
tioned General Sharon's role in the massacre.
51. Id. at 542.
52. Id.
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The Israeli government subsequently convened a special com-
mission, headed by Yitzhak Kahan, President of the Israeli Supreme
Court, to investigate the attack." The Kahan Commission ultimately
assigned General Sharon indirect responsibility for the massacre.54
Time's alleged libel, one paragraph in length, was based on a
secret section of the Kahan Commission's report, referred to as Ap-
pendix B."5 The disputed paragraph detailed a meeting between
General Sharon and the family of Lebanese President, Bashir
Gemayel, who had been assassinated just two days before the
Phalangist attack on the Palestinian refugee camps. Time alleged
that General Sharon discussed with the Gemayels the need for the
Phalangists to extract revenge for Bashir Gemayel's assassination.
6
General Sharon contended that the paragraph implied both that
he instigated the massacre at the refugee camps, and that the Kahan
Commission "had secret evidence . . . that he had lied when he tes-
tified that he had not known in advance that a massacre would oc-
cur."57 General Sharon also accused Time of anti-Semitism and
"blood libel," a phrase "historically associated in Western conscious-
ness with Christians' attacks on Jews.""
In response, Time asserted that the first amendment provided
the press with absolute immunity from litigation for statements con-
cerning the official conduct of high government officials."9 Time fur-
ther argued that such statements should be granted absolute immu-
nity for three reasons:
[F]irst, because eliminating the danger of legal liability would
53. R. SMOLLA, SUING THE PREss 81 (1986).
54. Sharon, 599 F. Supp. at 542.
55. The allegedly libelous paragraph read as follows:
One section of the report, known as Appendix B, was not published at all,
mainly for security reasons. That section contains the names of several intelli-
gence agents referred to elsewhere in the report. TIME has learned that it also
contains further details about Sharon's visit to the Gemayel family on the day
after Bashir Gemayel's assassination. Sharon reportedly told the Gemayels that
the Israeli army would be moving into West Beirut and that he expected the
Christian forces to go into the Palestinian refugee camps. Sharon also reportedly
discussed with the Gemayels the need for the Phalangists to take revenge for the
assassination of Bashir, but the details of the conversation are not known.
Id. at 543.
56. Id.
57. Sharon, 599 F. Supp. at 542.
58. R. SMOLLA, supra note 53, at 82. Mr. Smolla explains that "blood libel specifically
refers to pogroms in which the irrational attacks on Jews were fed by the charges that Jews
had kidnapped Christian children to use their blood in religious and medicinal rites involving
ritualistic murders." Id.
59. Sharon, 599 F. Supp. at 543.
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encourage full and free discussion of critically important issues,
such as responsibility for the brutal slaughter of innocent civil-
ians; second, because giving the press absolute immunity for
statements about public officials' performance of their jobs is
consistent with the absolute immunity such officials enjoy for
statements made in the course of their public duties; and third,
because public officials such as Minister Sharon have sufficient
access to the press to rebut charges made against them."
However, the court denied Time's motions to dismiss and for
summary judgment,"1 observing that prior Supreme Court decisions
provided the media with ample protection. Indeed, the court noted
that the actual malice standard and the various privileges for fair
reporting and statement of opinion "prohibit the imposition of liabil-
ity on any defendant who has acted in good faith."6 2
Judge Sofaer," presiding judge, played a unique role in the
Sharon trial. Israel initially refused to release Appendix B,64 citing
reasons of national security. Judge Sofaer, who had extensive per-
sonal contact with Israeli academicians and politicians, arranged for
the Israeli attorneys for Time and General Sharon to read the secret
document in Israel in the presence of Yitzhak Kahan.6 Kahan
would answer "yes" or "no" to three questions, and both sides
agreed to accept Kahan's answers as evidence and further stipulated
to keep the document's contents secret.66 From this process it was
determined that Appendix B lacked the information asserted by
Time.
In addition, Judge Sofaer detoured from the standard jury in-
structions for libel. He instructed the jury to return to the courtroom
as soon as it reached an answer to each of the following separate
questions: 1) Was the article defamatory?; 2) Was it false?; 3) Was
it written with actual malice?6" From this process the jury found
Time not guilty of actual malice and thus innocent of libel. How-
ever, this three-part approach to a verdict enabled General Sharon to
claim a moral, although not a legal, victory: the jury found Time
60. Id. at 554.
61. Id. at 588.
62. Id. at 554.
63. Federal District Judge for the Southern District of New York.
64. See supra note 55.
65. R. SMOLLA, supra note 53, at 81.
66. R. SMOLLA, supra note 53, at 90.
,67. Evans, Declarations of Victory (Book Review), NEW YORK TIMEs BOOK REV. 88
(Aug. 11, 1987).
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guilty of publishing a false, defamatory article.68
68. Id. Unwarranted libel actions filed by public officials are not the exclusive source of
media chill. The concentration of control and ownership within the print and broadcast media
has greatly exacerbated that chill. In fact, the potential for libel litigation has caused numerous
reporters, writers, and publishers to reduce coverage on controversial subjects and litigious
individuals. Simultaneously, the marketplace for ideas is being depleted by mergers, acquisi-
tions, and takeovers of both the print and electronic media. Recent demographics indicate that
the dual intent of the first amendment's freedom of the press clause to provide a forum for a
multitude of views and to serve as a check on the three branches of government could be
faltering.
Between 1960 and 1986, the United States' population increased by over 60 million per-
sons. Abstracts, supra note 12, at 8. Simultaneously, the American passion for electronic gad-
getry soared as indicated by the dramatic increase in all areas of electronic media. In 1960,
approximately 46 million households owned television sets; by 1986, that number had risen to
86 million. Abstracts, supra note 12, at 531. The number of television stations increased from
559 to 1235, during the same period, and average television viewing hours per day rose from
5.1 in 1960 to 7.1 in 1985. Abstracts, supra note 12, at 531. Likewise, the number of radio
stations increased from 6595 in 1969 to 9766 in 1985. 102 F.C.C.2d 145, 202 (1986).
In contrast, the daily print news circulation maintained a steady circulation rate, increas-
ing only slightly from 58.9 million in 1960 to 62.8 million in 1986. Abstracts, supra note 12,
at 531. When compared to the substantial increase in population, this figure actually indicates
a seven percent decline in readership. In order to maintain readership at the 1960 levels (33%),
daily print news circulation in 1986 should have been 79.4 million.
Concurrent with the overall decline in readership, the total number of weekly newspapers
in operation decreased from 11,315 in 1960 to 9144 in 1986, Abstracts, supra note 12, at 536,
while daily newspapers dropped approximately 10% from 1854 to 1671 during the same pe-
riod. Abstracts, supra note 12, at 536.
The print and electronic media enjoy a symbiotic relationship, as reflected in the cross-
ownership of the two mediums. The nine largest newspaper publishers, owning over 30% of
the country's newspapers, also control 25% of the television stations. See supra note 13 and
accompanying text. While newspaper publishers are allowed to own an unlimited number of
daily and weekly newspapers and similar publications, the federal government restricts multi-
ple ownership of broadcast stations. In fact, the FCC limits multiple ownership to 12 AM
stations, 12 FM stations, and 12 television stations, as long as the 12 television stations reach
no more than 25% of the nation's homes. B/C, supra, note 13, at A34. However, if two
stations in each service are owned by minorities, then group broadcasters are allowed to own a
maximum of 14 stations. B/C, supra note 13, at A34.
Cross-ownership of print and electronic media is best understood by examining the hold-
ings of organizations such as Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., with 20 daily and weekly newspapers,
and eight television stations. B/C, supra note 13, at A53. Capital Cities/ABC and NBC to-
gether reach over 20% of the country's viewers; CBS stations, on the other hand, alone reach
19% of all viewers. Newsweek Magazine, Jul. 27, 1987, at 30. However, not all media behe-
moths engage in extensive cross-ownership. For example, the Donrey Media Group owns ap-
proximately 120 daily and weekly newspapers, and only one television station. B/C, supra
note 13, at A53-54.
Nonetheless, of the largest newspaper publishers who also own a substantial number of
broadcast stations, Gannett Co. Inc. and Park Communications are more typical, owning 88
papers and seven television stations, B/C, supra note 13, at A54, and 75 papers and seven
television stations, respectively. B/C, supra note 13, at A57.
Furthermore, the FCC restrictions have not dissuaded groups such as Time, Inc. from
purchasing a cable television system from Group W Cable for $55 million, Wall St. J. Index,
Jan. 13, 1987, at 13, col. 4 (hereinafter WSJI); or NBC from purchasing WJVJ-TV in
Miami, Florida, for $270 million, WSJI, Jan. 19, 1987, at 8, col. 1; or William Dean Single-
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B. The Implications of Westmoreland and Sharon
The Westmoreland and Sharon cases epitomize the problems
inherent in current libel litigation. Enormous legal costs, complex
legal issues, and questionable political motives for bringing suit were
present in both cases.
Small newspapers and independent television stations can ill af-
ford to engage in libel litigation. The Westmoreland and Sharon de-
fenses together cost well over $10 million.69 Large organizations that
generate substantial income, such as Time and CBS, obviously are in
a better position to engage in legal battles than smaller
organizations.' °
Furthermore, some issues are "too large, too subjective, [and]
too political to be decided by juries on a true-false basis. . . .", In
fact, after the Westmoreland suit was settled, the judge commented
that "judgments of history are too subtle and too complex to be re-
solved satisfactorily with the simplicity of a jury verdict. '72 Nonethe-
less, suits initiated by government officials over news articles criticiz-
ing their political conduct are proceeding to trial with increasing
ton from purchasing the Denver Post for $95 million, the Houston Post for $150 million, and
the Dallas Times Herald for $110 million. San Jose Mercury News, Sept. 10, 1987, at IF,
col. 1 (hereinafter SJM). Singleton and the Media News Group, together with partner Gen-
eral Media, now control the eleventh largest newspaper chain, reaching 1.3 million readers. In
fact, the circulation of Singleton's most recent acquisitions totals over 776,000. Id.
The earnings generated by the larger media organizations indicate that these organiza-
tions are capable of acting as a de facto fourth branch of government. In 1986, the E.W.
Scripps Co.'s 53 papers and nine television stations earned well over $500 million; likewise,
the New York Times Co. reported earnings in excess of $1.39 billion; Gannett Co. recorded
earnings of over $2.21 billion; and the Times-Mirror Co. generated approximately $2.95 bil-
lion. S&P, supra note 13, at 2337.
These media behemoths are financially able to defend themselves in litigation, and can
thus continue to serve as a check on the three branches of government. However, extensive
cross-ownership by these giants could result in homogeneous perspectives offered on the same
material. Hence, when reporters and editors decline to publish articles for fear of retributive
libel litigation, media centralization further limits public access to information and results in
increased propaganda rather than open discussion and debate on matters of public concern.
69. Massing, supra note 9, at 34. General Westmoreland's legal fees alone amounted to
approximately $3 million. Rothmyer, supra note 47, at 26-27. Similar expenses were incurred
in the Sharon trial, prompting Judge Sofaer to comment: "That this process has proved enor-
mously expensive, and painfully contentious, is as much the product of Time's all-out litigation
strategy as of any plan by the plaintiff to intimidate the press." Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F.
Supp. 538, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
70. Massing, supra note 9, at 34. For example, the Point Reyes Light (circulation
3,500) won a Pulitzer Prize for its exposes of Synanon in the late 1970's. Since 1979, Synanon
lawyers have filed six suits in excess of $1 billion against the Point Reyes Light.
71. Lewis, Libel: What the Courts Could Do, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. 20, 21 (May-
June 1985).
72. Id.
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In addition, circumstances surrounding the Westmoreland and
Sharon trials suggest that protecting or redeeming reputation was
not the sole reason for initiating the libel actions.73 General West-
moreland's legal counsel, provided to him free of charge, received
large donations from conservative organizations staunchly opposed to
CBS' political and social views. 74 One conservative organization,
Fairness in Media, also attempted to influence CBS' policy by
purchasing network stock.75 Another organization, the American Le-
gal Foundation, expressed their criticism of CBS by filing a com-
plaint regarding the General Westmoreland documentary with the
FCC. 76
Finally, General Sharon's repeated claims of anti-Semitism and
blood libel led Time's attorneys to question whether General Sharon
initiated the suit solely to "vindicate the State of Israel and the Jew-
ish people. ' 77 General Sharon's motives for bringing suit were
deemed irrelevant78 by the court, which insisted that "[t]he claim
that Time is biased against Israel or Jews is so unsubstantiated that
no evidence on the subject will be allowed." 7 ' Nonetheless, General
Sharon's continued use of the term "blood libel" illustrates the de-
gree to which libel suits can be used as political weapons, and not
merely as efforts to restore one's damaged reputation.
III. PROBLEM
The chill resulting from libel suits and the attendant controver-
sies indicate a larger national malaise. It evinces a general distrust of
the media, considered perhaps too pervasive, powerful, and manipu-
lative. Consequently, it is thought that:
Important news, responsible commentary, and political advocacy
may not be reaching the public. For example, apparently out of
73. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
74. Massing, supra note 9, at 27. At the time of trial, General Westmoreland's attorney,
Dan Burt, was the head of the conservative organization, Capital Legal Foundation. Richard
Scaife, publisher of the Sacramento Union and the Greensburg, Pennsylvania Tribune-Re-
view, donated $2 million to aid Burt's preparation of General Westmoreland's case. Scaife also
established the American Legal Foundation in 1980 with a generous grant. Rothmyer, supra
note 47, at 28.
75. Rothmyer, supra note 47, at 28.
76. Rothmyer, supra note 47, at 27. The FCC rejected this complaint in March 1983.
Id.
77. Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
78. Id. at 586.
79. Id. at 587.
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fear of libel suits, some twenty scientific journals declined to
publish a study by scientists at the National Institute of Health
which criticized the methodology of other prominent research-
ers. Newspaper and magazine publishers acknowledge decisions
not to run controversial stories that they believed to be true but
could not economically afford to stand behind. Fear of libel suits
is also silencing citizens' criticism of powerful community
figures. S0
Media chill also suggests an intellectual retreat from first
amendment rights. In fact, some legal scholars maintain that undue
self-censorship by the press and lack of circulation of ideas lead,
eventually, to tyranny.8 1 The progression of Supreme Court policy
since 1974 indicates a shift away from nurturing first amendment
free press principles, and toward guarding the reputation interests of
those whose actions should be subjected to open discussion and de-
bate. It is questionable whether such policy is either in keeping with
the intent of Thomas Jefferson and the other Enlightenment Fram-
ers of the Constitution,8" for whom "[fireedom of inquiry and liberty
of expression were deemed essential to the discovery and spread of
truth,"8 or conducive to ensuring an independent check on the three
branches of government. Freedom of the press is essential if people
are to make informed decisions and legislators are to implement
those decisions. A press shackled by public distrust and increasing
libel litigation cannot adequately serve either as a check on the three
branches of government or as a marketplace for ideas.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Present State of Libel Law
1. Problematic Areas
Present libel law has spawned far-reaching social and legal
problems. Substantial confusion exists over the precise meaning of
''actual malice," and how actual malice differs from other forms of
malice. In New York Times,84 the Court defined "actual malice" as
80. Barrett, Declaratory Judgments for Libel: A Better Alternative, 74 CALIF. L. REV.
847, 860-61 (1986).
81. See generally Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT.
REV. 245.
82. R. HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 3-8 (1974).
83. Cox, First Amendment, SOCIETY 9 (Nov.-Dec. 1986).
84. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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knowledge or reckless disregard of a statement's truth or falsity.8"
Confusion has arisen when lower courts interpret actual malice to
denote hatred or ill will.8 Not surprisingly, "[g]arbled interpreta-
tions [of the actual malice standard] by the lower courts have already
begun to appear, introducing ill will and evil intent into the New
York Times test."87 Even the Supreme Court has not been immune
from confusing the various types of malice.88
Furthermore, many libel actions have been initiated under the
guise of other tort actions in an attempt to escape the strenuous con-
stitutional limitations imposed by New York Times. 9 However, most
courts appear unwilling to tolerate creative pleading in defamation
actions.
In addition, under current libel law, unlimited discovery has re-
sulted in immense litigation costs. By allowing evidence regarding
85. Id. at 279-80.
86. The California legislature, for example, defined actual malice as "that state of mind
arising from hatred or ill will toward the plaintiff." CAL. Civ. CODE § 48a(4)(d) (West 1982).
87. Comment, Aftermath of Herbert v. Lando: Will Lower Courts Create Another
Qualified Newsman's Privilege?, 10 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 691, 709 (1980).
88. In his dissent in Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 199-202 (1979), Justice Stewart
commented that, while the majority had "carefully enunciated the correct New York Times
test[,] ...[it] ...then followed a false trail, explainable only by an unstated misapprehen-
sion of the meaning of New York Times 'actual malice'. . . ." Id. at 200-01.
89. For example, Synanon brought suit against the Reader's Digest Association over the
publication of a 1981 article concerning Synanon's history, methods and success rates of treat-
ment, and alleged policy of intimidation. Reader's Digest Ass'n v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d
244, 249-50, 690 P.2d 610, 612-13, 208 Cal. Rptr. 137, 139-40 (1984). While Synanon's main
cause of action was based on libel, the second amended complaint, based on false light invasion
of privacy ("invasion of privacy by placing plaintiffs in a 'false light'...." Id. at 265, 690
P.2d at 624, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 151) and intentional infliction of emotional distress, arose from
the same facts as the libel cause of action. Id. at 265, 690 P.2d at 624, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 151.
The California Supreme Court asserted that "constitutional protection does not depend on the
label given the cause of action; it bars not only actions for defamation, but also claims for
invasion of privacy." Id. (citations omitted).
In a similar manner, author William Peter Blatty sued the New York Times Company
for failing to include his novel, Legion, on the Times' weekly best seller list. Blatty v. New
York Times Co., 42 Cal. 3d 1033, 728 P.2d 1177, 232 Cal. Rptr. 542 (1986). Blatty's com-
plaint was based on injurious falsehood of a statement, id. at 1039, 728 P.2d at 1180, 232 Cal.
Rptr. at 545, and asserted negligent and intentional interference with prospective economic
advantage, negligence, and trade libel. Id. at 1036, 728 P.2d at 1178, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 543.
Once again, the California Supreme Court refused to allow "creative pleading" to "[render
constitutional] limitations nugatory," id. at 1045, 728 P.2d at 1184, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 549, and
maintained that no cause of action could claim "talismanic immunity" from the limitations set
forth in New York Times v. Sullivan. Id. at 1042-43, 728 P.2d at 1182-83, 232 Cal. Rptr. at
547 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964)).
Finally, real estate mogul Donald Trump filed a $500 million suit against the Chicago
Tribune for mocking his intent to build the world's largest building. Massing, supra note 9, at
33.
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the defendant's state of mind and the editorial process to be admit-
ted,90 the Supreme Court has increased the amount of discovery and,
hence, overall litigation costs. 9 Inevitably, such costs "intimidate the
press and lead to self-censorship, particularly where smaller newspa-
pers and broadcasters are involved."' 2
In like manner, damage awards have increased in proportion to
litigation costs. Juries have demonstrated a propensity to "give away
the farm"'" when determining damage awards, making libel litiga-
tion even more frightening to the media. Consequently, courts occa-
sionally aid the media by setting aside clearly outrageous awards. 4
The increase in libel insurance deductibles and the reluctance of
some insurance companies to provide libel insurance to the media
has exacerbated problems for smaller newspapers and broadcasters.
In 1983, approximately seventy-five percent of the print and elec-
tronic media carried libel insurance." Today, however:
[L]ibel insurance is often unavailable at any cost, or, if availa-
ble, is beyond the means of many small publishers. Insurers
have raised deductibles and lowered coverage maximums. At
least one insurer requires twenty percent copayment of defense
costs after the deductible has been exceeded. One major libel
insurance carrier has dropped out of the field entirely and
others have ceased writing new policies."
Finally, there has been increased public cynicism "regarding
press accuracy and the integrity of public figures and officials.' '97 A
recent Gallup Poll 8 indicates that public confidence in the print and
electronic media is extremely low. Of the ten major American insti-
tutions covered, television received the lowest ranking, while the
print media ranked fourth from the bottom."
90. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979). See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying
text.
91. Indeed, Lando's deposition alone required 26 sessions and spanned 3,000 pages.
Comment, supra note 87, at 722-23.
92. Comment, supra note 87, at 723 n.211 (citing Herbert, 441 U.S. at 176 n.25.
93. Massing, supra note 9, at 33.
94. For example, a Texas court of appeals overturned a $2 million libel award against
the Dallas Morning News, noting that the jury acted out of "passion and prejudice against
newspapers" and had no foundation on which to base their verdict. Massing, supra note 9, at
33.
95. Barrett, supra note 80, at 858.
96. Barrett, supra note 80, at 858 (citations omitted).
97. Barrett, supra note 80, at 861.
98. Gallup Public Opinion Poll, 1987 Scholarly Resources, Inc., at 272-79. The poll
was conducted between July 11-14, 1986, and compiled on December 21, 1986.
99. Id. In descending order, the percentage of those polled had "a great deal" of confi-
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Allowing libel suits, which have a chilling effect on the media,
to proceed to trial is an imprudent use of the judicial system. High
legal costs and lengthy preparation time ensures that other, poten-
tially more urgent, litigation must wait. 00 Such suits also force jour-
nalists to devote substantial amounts of time preparing for litigation
rather than attending to their professional responsibilities.10 1
2. Proposals to Change Current Libel Law
Legal scholars, jurists, and legislators recognize the need to
make current libel law both more manageable and more equitable.
In light of this recognition, several possible solutions have been pro-
posed. For example, in 1985, Representative Charles Schumer intro-
duced H.R. 2846 to establish a new cause of action for public offi-
cials allegedly defamed by the media.' 2 The Schumer Bill was
intended to "protect the constitutional right to freedom of speech by
establishing a new action for defamation,"' 03 allowing public officials
to bring lawsuits for declaratory judgment.'
Professor Marc Franklin recently proposed a modified version
of the Schumer Bill entitled the Plaintiff's Option Libel Reform Act
(POLRA).' 0 5 Citing the failure of state courts to appreciate the dif-
ferences between libel law and other types of damages law, 0 6
Franklin recommends a declaratory judgment cause of action in
which, first, there would be no proof requirement regarding state of
mind evidence, thus effectively abolishing Herbert v. Lando;07 sec-
ond, no damages would be awarded; third, the plaintiff would have
the burden of proving each element with clear and convincing evi-
dence in the following institutions: the military, 63%; churches and organized religion, 57%;
the U.S. Supreme Court, 53%; banks and public schools, 49%; Congress, 41%; newspapers,
37%; organized labor, 29%; big business, 28%; and television, 27%. The national trend of
confidence in newspapers has been: 1973-39%; 1979-51%; 1983-38%; 1985-35%. The national
trend of confidence in television has been: 1973-37%; 1979-38%; 1983-25%; 1985-29%.
100. Barrett, supra note 80, at 861.
101. The Charleston Gazette, for example, was forced into 25 libel suits in 10 years. Of
the 13 suits pending in 1984, 10 of those were filed on behalf of public officials, candidates,
and attorneys. One particular suit well represented the type of harassment endured by the
Charleston Gazette: a Republican candidate for public office sued over a cartoon depicting him
as an "elephant-tamer, claiming it portrayed him as a practitioner of bestiality." Massing,
supra note 9, at 33. *
102. Barrett, supra note 80, at 847-51.
103. H.R. 2846, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
104. Barrett, supra note 80, at 851.
105. Franklin, A Declaratory Judgment Alternative to Current Libel Law, 74 CALIF.
L. REv. 809, 812 (1986).
106. Id. at 811.
107. 441 U.S. 153 (1979). See also supra notes 35-37.
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dence; and, all privileges currently existing at common law would
continue in effect."0 8 In addition, an "appropriate retraction"'0 9 by
the defendant before the action was filed would be considered a com-
plete defense.
In a POLRA action for damages based on libel, slander, or
false light invasion of privacy, Franklin recommends preserving the
New York Times standard for proving both falsity and actual malice
by clear and convincing evidence."' Moreover, while punitive dam-
ages would be disallowed under POLRA, reasonable attorneys' fees
would be awarded to the prevailing party, with some exceptions."'
Under the POLRA plan, a retraction issued by the media
would foreclose declaratory judgments, but not damage actions."' A
retraction published after the plaintiff brought an action for declara-
tory judgment would not be considered a complete defense, but
would entitle a prevailing defendant to recover attorneys' fees." 8
Franklin maintains that this would encourage plaintiffs to settle once
the retraction is published." 4
Franklin asserts that POLRA would be successful for three rea-
sons. First, POLRA plaintiffs would be more inclined to present evi-
dence of falsity at the outset."" Second, media defendants would feel
less threatened by libel litigation, knowing that punitive damages
would not be allowed and that a prevailing defendant could recover
attorneys' fees." 6 Finally, the public would be aware of a maligned
plaintiff's alternative to extensive and costly litigation, and thus have
less sympathy for those plaintiffs choosing to sue for extravagant
sums of money.1 1 7
Franklin advocates implementation of POLRA at the state level
because states are in a better position to experiment with the propo-
sal," 8 and such experimentation could take years before being per-
fected. In the meantime, however, small publishers and broadcasters
remain vulnerable," 9 and the chilling effect of libel litigation would
108. Franklin, supra note 105, at 812.
109. Franklin, supra note 105, at 812.
110. Franklin, supra note 105, at 813.
111. Franklin, supra note 105, at 813.
112. Franklin, supra note 105, at 816.
113. Franklin, supra note 105, at 817.
114. Franklin, supra note 105, at 817.
115. Franklin, supra note 105, at 814.
116. Franklin, supra note 105, at 816.
117. Franklin, supra note 105, at 816.
118. Franklin, supra note 105, at 819.
119. Barrett, suprd note 80, at 865.
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continue."
Alternatively, Judge Lois Forer proposes a "return to the com-
mon law rationale and standard for punitive damages""' by reinsti-
tuting the negligence standard for libel actions. This would dispense
with both the public figure/private figure distinction, 2 " and the em-
phasis placed on proving the defendant's state of mind in order to
determine actual malice."' Judge Forer further advocates statutory
change' in which "fact" and "opinion" would be defined, and "li-
bel" would be redefined.' 25 Judge Forer maintains that a redefini-
tion of libel is necessary because the present terms are "read with the
gloss of centuries of interpretation, [they are] anachronistic.""" The
test of truth, then, would be based on the document as a whole,"2 7
rather than one paragraph2 . or three sentences.' 9
Concerned with similar matters, the Tort Policy Working
Group (TPWG) is reassessing the damages issue for tort actions." 0
TPWG recommends both a limit of $100,000 for non-economic
damages including punitive damages, and a sliding scale for attor-
neys' fees. "' While TPWG has not specifically addressed libel liti-
gation, the limitation on damages could apply to all tort litigation,
including libel.'
Other suggestions to improve libel law include: establishing a
"National News Council to arbitrate libel cases";"' requiring the
losing side to pay all attorneys' fees;"" permitting retraction or equal
time remedies;" 5 eliminating punitive damages; "' setting maximum
120. Barrett, supra note 80, at 881.
121. L. FORER, A CHILLING EFFECT 331 (1987).
122. Id. at 340.
123. Id. at 341. See also supra notes 35-37.
124. L. FORER, supra note 121, at 338-42.
125. Id. at 340.
126. Id. at 339.
127. Id. at 340.
128. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
129. Reader's Digest Ass'n v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 244, 250, 690 P.2d 610, 613,
208 Cal. Rptr. 137, 140 (1984).
130. L. FORER, supra note 121, at 329.
131. L. FORER, supra note 121, at 329.
132. L. FORER, supra note 121, at 329.
133. L. FORER, supra note 121, at 326 (citing a remark made by General William
Westmoreland in the Philadelphia Retainer, Oct. 9, 1982, at 12).
134. R. SMOLLA, supra note 53, at 239.
135. R. SMOLLA, supra note 53, at 240; Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Fo-
cus on Remedy, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 772, 835 (1986).
136. R. SMOLLA, supra note 53, at 241.
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levels for non-pecuniary losses;187 and granting absolute immunity
from libel suits brought by high ranking public officials for matters
arising out of public duty.'
Several of the recommendations are viable and presently may be
under discussion at either the federal or state level. If enacted, any of
these solutions could take years to implement. Many publishers and
broadcasters cannot wait that long, and hence must consider other
alternatives under existing libel law.
V. PROPOSAL
A. The Combined Tort
A combined tort based on abuse of process' 39 and 42 U.S.C. §
19831 4'could be used to alleviate some of the problems caused by
libel suits. The proposed strategy is intended to aid those media de-
fendants who have commented on the actions of public officials act-
ing in their official capacity.
f. Abuse of Process
•Abuse of process is an action based on "misusing, or misapply-
ing process justified in itself for an end other than that which it was
designed to accomplish,"'' rather than filing an action without justi-
fication. The abuse of process tort consists of two elements: an im-
proper willful act performed during the regular course of a proceed-
ing;"'2 and an ulte.rior motive, which "usually takes the form of
coercion to obtain a collateral advantage not properly involved in the
proceeding itself."'"3 Because establishing ulterior motive alone is
not sufficient, the tort must be viewed in terms of how the public
137. R. SMOLLA, supra note 53, at 242; Ingber, supra note 135, at 833.
138. R. SMOLLA, supra note 53, at 243; Comment, Absolute Immunity for Political
Libel, 90 DICK. L. REv. 559, 559-83 (1986).
139. See supra note 17.
140. See supra note 18.
141. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS 897 (5th ed. 1984) (hereinafter PROSSER).
142. Id. at 898.
143. Spellens v. Spellens, 49 Cal. 2d 210, 232, 317 P.2d 613, 627 (1957). Traditional
examples of abuse of process include: using regularly issued attachment for an improper pur-
pose, White Lighting Co. v. Wolfson, 68 Cal. 2d 336, 348-49, 438 P.2d 345, 352-53, 66 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 704-05 (1968); excessive attachment, PROSSER, supra note 141, at 899; attaching
property that is exempt from attachment, White Lighting, 68 Cal. 2d at 348, 438 P.2d at 352,
66 Cal. Rptr. at 704; and forcing the plaintiff to discharge a debtor's obligation to the defend-
ant, Templeton v. Purina, 69 Cal. 2d 461, 466 P.2d 152, 72 Cal. Rptr. 344 (1968).
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official used the legal process.144
Damages for an abuse of process tort may be awarded "to vin-
dicate the right itself and to maintain the integrity of the judicial
process." 14 5 Attorneys' fees generally are not allowed because the
complaint and prosecution are in fact proper; it is the coercive con-
duct of the plaintiff in the main action that is improper.1 6
Filing an action based on abuse of process is often preferable to
filing similar counter suits, such as a suit based on malicious prose-
cution. In fact, the abuse of process action was designed to provide
an alternative to a malicious prosecution suit because that action
"fail[s] to provide a remedy for a group of cases in which legal pro-
cedure has been set in motion in proper form, with probable cause,
and even with ultimate success, but nevertheless has been perverted
to accomplish an ulterior purpose for which it was not designed." 47
Whereas an abuse of process action may be initiated at any point, a
malicious prosecution suit may be brought only when the prior liti-
gation is terminated in favor of the defendant. 48 Furthermore, the
plaintiff in a malicious prosecution case must prove both lack of
probable cause 49 and malice. 50 Some courts have held that
favorable termination of the prior proceeding indicates that probable
cause was lacking. 51
While malicious prosecution may be an appropriate response in
some'libel litigation, 52 its main disadvantage is the requirement that
144. Tellefsen v. Key Sys. Transit Lines, 198 Cal. App. 2d 611, 616, 17 Cal. Rptr. 919,
922 (1961). For example, Senator Paul Laxalt brought suit against the McClatchy Newspa-
pers for libel, conspiracy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. See supra note 5 and
accompanying text. The newspaper counterclaimed for abuse of process, alleging that Senator
Laxalt knew that he could not win the suit, and therefore, merely filing the libel complaint
amounted to an abuse of process. Laxalt v. McClatchy Newspapers, 622 F. Supp. 737, 751
(D. Nev. 1985). The presiding judge observed that merely filing a complaint did not amount to
abuse of process; rather, abuse of process hinged on the actions taken by the defendant after
filing the complaint. Id. at 752. Had Senator Laxalt alleged "minimal settlement offers or
huge batteries of motions filed solely for the purpose of coercing a settlement," id., the newspa-
per would have sustained its burden of proof.
145. PROSSER, supra note 141, at 900.
146. PROSSER, supra note 141, at 900.
147. PROSSER, supra note 141, at 897.
148. Tool Research & Eng'g v. Henigson, 46 Cal. App. 3d 675, 120 Cal. Rptr. 291
(1975).
149. Id. at 682.
150. Hazen v. Municipal of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1986); Industrial Power
and Light v. Western Modular Corp., 623 P.2d 291 (Alaska 1981); Bertero v. National Gen.
Corp., 13 Cal. 3d 43, 529 P.2d 608, 118 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1974).
151. Tool Research, 46 Cal. App. 3d at 682-83, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 296-97.
152. Brief for Appellant at 20-37, Walsh v. Bronson (No. A038686) (1st D. Cal. filed
Oct. 2, 1987). In October 1987, Attorney Thomas E. Kotoske filed a civil action on behalf of
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a claimant obtain a favorable termination of the prior proceeding
before initiating suit. This requirement means increased litigation
costs, it unduly prolongs the ordeal for media defendants, and there
is no guarantee that the verdict rendered in the prior action will be
favorable to the media defendant. Thus, abuse of process is the pref-
erable course of action.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
42 U.S.C. § 1983,153 most frequently associated with civil rights
actions, is intended to preserve personal liberty and human rights.""
It was enacted to "interpose the federal courts between the States
and the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights-to pro-
tect the people from unconstitutional action under color of state
law,"' 5 regardless of whether the disputed action was executive, leg-
islative, or judicial. Section 1983 was also intended to provide an
alternative to available state remedies.' 56
Before a complainant may bring a section 1983 action, she or he
must have been denied a federally-created right by a defendant act-
ing under color of law."5 7 To sustain the burden of proof, a com-
plainant must show that the defendant knew or reasonably should
have known that his or her conduct would violate the plaintiff's fed-
eral rights. 5 '
"Every person" who deprives an individual of a federally cre-
ated right may be sued under section 1983.' However, most courts
limit liability "almost. without exception, [to] state or local offi-
three newspaper reporters employed by the McClatchy Newspapers in Sacramento, Califor-
nia. The reporters had been named as defendants in a libel action in 1982. Kotoske's com-
plaint was based on malicious prosecution and conspiracy.
153. See supra note 18.
154. Davey v. Tomlinson, 627 F. Supp. 1458 (E.D. Mich. 1986). Section 1983 was
enacted pursuant to the fourteenth amendment at the end of the Civil War, and originated as
section 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871. S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES 3-4 (1979). In 1874, Congress codified the Ku Klux Klan Act, and "the substantive
portion of section one of the 1871 Act became a separate section identical to the present section
1983." Id. at 4.
155. S. NAHMOD, supra note 154, at 4 (citing Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242
(1972)).
156. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961) (justice Douglas observed that "Itihe
federal remedy is to supplement the state remedy and the latter need not be first sought and
refused before the federal one is invoked." Id.); Alacare North, Inc. v. Baggiano, 785 F.2d 963
(11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 829 (1986).
157. See supra note 18.
158. Smith-Bey v. District of Columbia, 546 F. Supp. 813 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
159. S. NAHMOD, supra note 154, at 10.
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cials."'"6 Suits against government officials in their individual capac-
ities are always permissible. 61 Furthermore, the acts of high-rank-
ing government officials also might bind the governmental body. 62
Likewise, governmental entities are liable in their official capacity if
they are the "moving force behind the deprivation."' 63
A successful complainant may recover actual damages, includ-
ing special damages for out-of-pocket expenses, 64 general damages
for such items as emotional distress,'65 and punitive damages if the
court finds actual malice, in which case anything short of an absolute
privilege for the defendant indicates recovery for the plaintiff.'66 Pre-
sumed damages also have been upheld in some instances.' 67 Recov-
ery of attorneys' fees has been authorized by Congress, 6 8 and in
fact, a prevailing plaintiff should "ordinarily recover an attorney's
160. Smith v. Losee, 485 F. 2d 334, 342 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908
(1974).
161. S. NAHMOD, supra note 154, at 180.
162. S. NAHMOD, supra note 154, at 181. Prior to 1976, governmental entities could not
be sued for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 violations. This rule was stated in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167 (1961). In that case, 13 Chicago police officers broke into the plaintiffs' house in the early
morning, routed them from bed, forced them to stand naked in the living room, and ransacked
every room, emptying drawers and ripping mattresses. Id. at 169. One of the plaintiffs was
then taken to the police station and questioned for 10 hours. It was later determined that the
officers involved in the incident had neither search warrants nor arrest warrants. Id. at 169.
Writing the majority opinion, Justice Douglas stated that because municipal corporations were
not intended to be held liable in section 1983 actions, id. at 187, it was proper to dismiss the
claim against the city, but improper to dismiss the claim against the individual officers. Id. at
192. The immunity from liability in section 1983 suits enjoyed by governmental entities ended
in 1976 with the decision in Monell v. Dep't of Social Serv., 532 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1976). See
infra note 163.
163. Monell, 532 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1976). In 1976, city employees brought an action
against the Board of Education and the Department of Social Services, challenging a rule
which compelled pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absence before medical reasons
compelled them to do so. Monell overruled Monroe by holding that local government bodies
are persons for section 1983 purposes. Id. Under Monell and subsequent decisions, govern-
mental entities are liable in their official capacity when they are "the moving force behind the
deprivation." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985).
164. Smith, 485 F.2d at 345.
165. Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 429 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1970).
166. Smith, 485 F.2d at 344-45.
167. Lee, 429 F.2d at 291.
168. The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 states in pertinent part:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections. . .[42 U.S.C.
1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986], title IX of Public Law 92-318, or in any
civil action or proceeding, by or on behalf of the United States of America, to
enforce, or charging a violation of a provision of, the United States Internal
Revenue Code, or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a rea-
sonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976).
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fee unless special circumstances would render such an award un-
just." 6 Prevailing defendants are awarded attorneys' fees only if the
action is deemed frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. 7 '
Numerous 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cases have been based on first
amendment issues.17' Successful suits have been brought against gov-
ernment officials who intended the result which occurred, or officials
who knowingly punished the plaintiff for exercising his or her first
amendment rights.7"'
Defendants in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions have several defenses
available to them, including the "good faith" defense. Although this
defense generally is not considered a defense to civil rights viola-
tions, 7 ' if properly raised, it can defeat a section 1983 action at the
outset. 7 4 Good faith is a qualified immunity for police officers, state
executives, school board members, mental hospital administrators,
prison officials, and parole board officers. 175 If a qualified immunity
is found, a judge must rule in favor of the defendant as a matter of
169. S. NAHMOD, svpra note 154, at 26 (citing Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., 390
U.S. 400, 402 (1968)).
170. S. NAHMOD, supra note 154, at 26-27 (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v.
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978)).
171. Section 1983 actions have been filed in freedom of speech cases, including one in-
stance in which police officers destroyed a sign critical of the President of the United States,
held by a woman standing along the route of the President's motorcade. Glasson v. Louisville,
518 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1975). A section 1983 religious freedom suit was filed by a member of
the Unification Church who sued the police, his parents, and seven deprogrammers, alleging
that the police knew of his abduction by his parents and deprogrammers but failed to intervene
because of their opinions about the Unification Church. Cooper v. Molko, 512 F. Supp. 563
(N.D. Cal. 1981).
A'section 1983 freedom of the press action was brought by the Gannett Satellite Informa-
tion Network, Inc., which attempted to place newspaper vending machines in a commuter
train station owned and operated by the state of Massachusetts. The Metropolitan Transpor-
tation Authority (MTA) refused to allow Gannett to distribute their newspapers. A subse-
quent suit by Gannet prompted a federal court in 1984 to find that a commuter train station is
an appropriate forum in which to distribute newspapers, and that Gannett had a constitutional
right to install newspaper vending machines at the station. Gannett Satellite Information Net-
work, Inc. v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 745 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1984).
The publishers of two newspapers brought a section 1983 action against the Attorney
General of Alabama in 1973 seeking to have a state statute declared unconstitutional. Lewis v.
Baxley, 368 F. Supp. 768 (M.D. Ala. 1973). The statute required the press to disclose their
economic interests prior to being allowed admittance to galleries, press rooms, committee meet-
ings, and the like. The Alabama district court ruled that the press had a limited first amend-
ment right of reasonable access to go where the public in general may go, as well as access to
certain items of news. Id. at 777.
172. S. NAHMOD, supra note 154, at 65.
173. United States ex rel. Jones v. Rundle, 358 F. Supp. 939 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
174. Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 609 (7th Cir. 1973).
175. S. NAHMOD, supra note 154, at 229-30.
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law. 16 A two-pronged test has been designed to determine whether
the defendant acted in good faith: the defendant must have acted sin-
cerely, without malice, and in the belief that his or her actions were
proper; and the defendant must not have acted in ignorance of or
with disregard for settled principles of constitutional law. 17 More-
over, the good faith immunity is restricted to acts or duties within
the scope of the official's power or normal exercise of duties. 1 8 Ab-
solute immunity exists for state legislators, judges, and prosecutors
who have acted "in a field where legislators traditionally have power
to act.' 7 9
3. Using the Combined Tort
Attorneys confronted with a libel suit initiated by a public offi-
cial against the media claimant for commenting on the official's con-
duct should consider filing a combined action based on abuse of pro-
cess and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This combined tort should be filed as a
counterclaim,' 80 alleging that damages resulted from the public offi-
cial's actions in filing suit. In addition, the counterclaim should
maintain that the plaintiff's willful and improper purpose was to
intentionally hamper the media's first amendment right of freedom
of the press. Indeed, as is well demonstrated by case law,' it was
not the intent of the first amendment that the media should have to
pay attorneys' fees in order to comment freely on issues of public
concern.
A cause of action based solely on either abuse of process or 42
U.S.C. § 1983 might be sufficient to render a judgment for the me-
dia. However, the likelihood of success is stronger if both torts are
set forth in one complaint. For the combined torts to be effective, the
media must allege that particular coercive acts were undertaken by
the public official after process was served.' 82 Coercive acts, such as
filing a barrage of motions solely for the purpose of inducing a settle-
ment, may be sufficient to establish abuse of process. 83 Furthermore,
such acts would strengthen the showing required by section 1983
176. Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334, 342 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908
(1974).
177. Perry v. Elrod, 436 F. Supp. 299, 304 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
178. Smith, 485 F.2d at 342.
179. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 379 (1951).
180. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a), (e).
181. See supra notes 19-37 and accompanying text.
182. Laxalt v. McClatchy Newspapers, 622 F. Supp. 737, 752 (D. Nev. 1985).
183. Id.
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that the claimant was deprived of a federally created right: in this
instance, freedom of the press.
VI. CONCLUSION
Twenty-six years ago, the Supreme Court cautioned that:
The vigorous criticism by press and citizen[s] of the conduct of
the government of the day by the officials of the day will soon
yield to silence if officials in control of government agencies, in-
stead of answering criticisms, can resort to friendly juries to
forestall criticism of their official conduct. 84
In order to fulfill the dual intent of the first amendment's free-
dom of the press clause, the press must be unshackled from the bur-
den of meritless libel litigation. Public officials must not be allowed
to intimidate the press by threatening to initiate frivolous libel ac-
tions. Failure to protect and nurture the fundamental free press
principles set forth by the Framers of the Constitution will reduce
the press to a mere conduit for government-approved propaganda.
Laura B. Choper
184. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 304 (1964).
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